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 
Abstract— This research in progress paper describes the role 
of cyber security measures undertaken in an ICT system for 
integrating electric storage technologies into the grid. To do so, it 
defines security requirements for a communications gateway and 
gives detailed information and hands-on configuration advice on 
node and communication line security, data storage, coping with 
backend M2M communications protocols and examines privacy 
issues. The presented research paves the road for developing 
secure smart energy communications devices that allow 
enhancing energy efficiency. The described measures are 
implemented in an actual gateway device within the HORIZON 
2020 project STORY, which aims at developing new ways to use 
storage and demonstrating these on six different demonstration 
sites. 
 
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, Energy storage, 
Information security, Power system management, Privacy, Smart 
grids  
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
N this paper we propose security requirements and privacy 
recommendations for a smart grid storage communications 
gateway (SCG). The intended purpose of this gateway is to 
provide a means of communication to distribute information 
about flows between energy production and storage devices of 
various sizes. The gateway is developed within the HORIZON 
2020 project added value of STORage in distribution sYstems 
(STORY), in the context of ICT supporting services to enhance 
the efficiency of storage systems. Going to be dedicated to 
transmitting data and control signals within demonstration 
sites, this gateway is regarded critical infrastructure, which 
obviously has severe security implications. The objective of 
this paper is to clarify these implications for network nodes, 
communication lines, machine-to-machine (M2M) protocols, 
data storage and privacy aspects. The presented results are 
more developed, yet work in progress, research based on a 
first publication in 2016 [1]. 
Being designed for the communications gateway developed 
in the STORY project, they can, in principle, also be applied 
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to any device with a similar profile (for instance other smart 
grid devices or smart appliances). For devices partially 
matching this profile (for instance ICT-enabled devices with 
well-known peers, see Section IV), the requirements 
concerning the matching parts may be applied. 
II. RELATED WORK 
While there is some theoretical work [2,3] on security 
aspects in smart energy systems and solutions for distinct 
problems in this area available [4,5], there is no 
comprehensive hands-on configuration guidance for 
developers of such energy devices. Therefore, the 
recommendations and requirements in this paper will serve 
also as a practical reference for connecting and interoperating 
M2M networks to ICT networks in the context of energy 
production, distribution, consumption and storage devices. 
This applicability set this paper in contrast to known security 
standards in the energy context operating at this level of detail, 
which are mostly limited to smart metering, like the protection 
profile of the German Office for Information Security [6]. 
Standards that follow a more general approach, on the other 
hand, are too unspecific to be used for practical 
implementation and are mostly designed for overall systems 
architectures rather than providing device-level guidance [7]. 
Other known approaches have a different focus regarding 
device purpose and security focus. The OGEMA project, for 
instance, aims on an architecture more resembling the 
emerging STORY Smart Energy Platform (see Section VII) 
and focuses its security effort to application security and user 
rights management [8].  
III. STORY PROJECT OVERVIEW 
STORY presents six different demonstration cases, each 
with different local/small-scale storage concepts and 
technologies, covering industrial and residential environments.  
These cases are situated in the mid to western parts of 
Europe: 
1) Demonstration at residential building scale, Oud-
Heverlee, Belgium 
2) Demonstration at residential neighborhood scale, 
Oud-Heverlee, Belgium 
3) Demonstration of storage in a factory, Navarra, 
Spain 
4) Demonstration of storage in residential district, 
Lecale, Northern Ireland 
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5) Demonstration of large scale storage unit in 
industrial and residential area, Hagen, Germany and 
Suha, Slovenia 
6) Demonstration of private multi energy grid in 
industrial area, Olen, Belgium 
The management of these different STORY systems in a 
smart multi-energy grid is a crucial element to facilitate 
communication, integrate control algorithms, increase 
interoperability and provide measurement services. 
A. STORY ICT Architecture 
Figure 1 displays the communication networks of STORY 
demonstration sites on a general level. The following three 
network types, based on their application location, are 
identified and for each type fixed, wireless, and mobile 
technologies can be applied: 
 Home Area Network (HAN), also called a Premises 
Area Network or a Subscriber Access Network; 
 Field Area Network (FAN), also called a neighborhood 
Area Network (NAN); 
 Wide Area Network (WAN). 
Depending on the size of the demonstration site different 
combinations of these network layers have been deployed. The 
common entities for all demonstrations are the gateway 
device, energy storage device and a WAN network. This view 
of the STORY architecture is idealized and generic. During 
the course of the project, it became evident that the 
communication levels are different at each demo site. If and 
how this could be harmonized is subject to further 
investigations (see Section VII). 
STORY demonstration sites will be connected to the 
Internet via the gateway device which is being developed 
within the project. All data (measurements, faults, warnings, 
acknowledgements and control signals) transferred within the 
system have to pass this SCG. The gateway therefore 
resembles a smart energy gateway, connecting prosumer 
systems to a power grid. 
Also, to broker applications between application providers 
and end users (prosumers), a separate Smart Energy Platform 
(SEP) will be developed (see Section VII). 
IV. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STORAGE 
COMMUNICATIONS GATEWAY 
One major challenge for the management of the proposed 
architecture is that energy requests and sensed measurement 
data have to be reliably transferred both internally within the 
demo sites and externally via a network outside of the demo 
site operators’ sphere of influence. This reliable transfer 
includes, besides availability and robustness, also additional 
security and privacy issues that arise when data is transferred 
through external networks. This section therefore defines the 
security requirements and covers the privacy aspects for the 
different facets of the gateway. 
 
A. Node Security Requirements 
For monitoring and configuration purposes, user interfaces 
will be required. This can be ranging from simple status views 
(for instance an energy level overview for prosumers) to 
interfaces for sophisticated data analytics for energy 
distribution prediction. In order to secure these interfaces, 
authentication and access control is one of the most crucial 
elements to secure the proposed system infrastructure. 
Therefore, depending on the size of the storage production 
capacity and their integration into the grid, two categories are 
introduced: 
 For demo sites with storage capacity dimensioned 
mainly for their own consumption, individual user 
login/ password combinations or eIDs are proposed; 
 For demo sites that are mainly under control by a DSO, 
a more sophisticated authentication process including a 
combination of a certificate (see [4] and role/ID-based 
authentication and access control process is planned.  
The latter (two-factor) authentication method needs more 
administrative effort (especially establishing a public key 
infrastructure), but at DSOs, the presence of the needed 
expertise and resources is assumed. Therefore, the 
maintenance of certificates is assumed pre-existing. 
The roles defined in the authentication (and authorization) 
may also be used for alerting; the system must be capable of 
reporting certain safety and security relevant events to 
distinctive people or groups thereof. Reporting methods may 
include email and SMS. Furthermore, the system may contain 
a security dashboard, displaying recent events on a 
management interface. We also propose up to eight and at 
least four levels of alert classes (each respectively 
corresponding to one or consolidating two Syslog logging 
levels [10]) to categorize these events and assign them to roles 
or groups to be alerted. Access control also includes 
measurements to prevent unauthorized access. To achieve this, 
the device must be hardened, which means that all unneeded 
services, users and file permissions (especially for executables 
with shell-like capabilities) must be deactivated. Further, a 
custom-compiled, reduced kernel (for instance not containing 
unneeded but reportedly error-prone network protocols or user 
interfaces) is also recommended to provide a smaller target to 
adversaries. Moreover, strict patch management and a host-
based firewall must be in place. 
 
Fig. 1 Overview of communication networks in demonstration sites. [9]  
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B. Communication Line Security Requirements 
Also, communication channels have to be secured. Due the 
limited resources normally available at embedded systems, a 
hybrid cryptosystem approach is used which combines the 
security benefit of a public-key cryptosystem with the 
efficiency of a symmetric-key cryptosystem. During the 
communication establishment, the asymmetric key is used to 
exchange the symmetric key, which used afterwards for an 
efficient data throughput. Such a hybrid approach is part of 
various cipher suites and should be enabled. 
In order to provide authentication and encryption, Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) must be used to provide communication 
security while traversing over foreign networks. The reasons 
for this implementation to choose TLS over alternatives (e.g. 
IPsec) are the following [11]: 
 TLS is easier to integrate between different vendors; 
 TLS needs less overhead; 
 TLS allows quicker handshakes; 
 TLS is easier to configure. 
These arguments apply particularly to the proposed 
gateway, as it will also be installed in prosumers’ households 
where knowledge needed to configure more complex 
protocols will not be present and the gateway hardware will 
only have limited resources. In constrained environments such 
as STORY demo sites that largely consume their own 
production themselves, Datagram Transport Layer Security 
(DTLS) might be used as a lightweight alternative. For the 
remainder of this document, all requirements regarding TLS 
apply to DTLS in the same manner. TLS is sometimes 
confounded with the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, but 
in contrast to the former it is not an Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) standard, although there is a specification for 
historic purposes [12]. This confusion occurs because TLS is 
the standardized version of SSL [13, p. 60] and has been 
further enhanced since then [14,15]. The various versions of 
SSL, however, have proven to be insecure and must not be 
used, not even as fallback methods [16]. We further propose to 
use the most recent version of TLS.  
To fully utilize the security features of TLS, this protocol 
stack has to be configured carefully. That means that 
encryption and authentication measures allowed in the 
standard, but regarded unsafe by now must not be used. The 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) published a guideline 
for the secure use of TLS [17]. The gateway must support and 
implementers must comply to these recommendations with the 
following additional security-enhancing constrictions: 
 Symmetric cipher with at least 128 bits (see below); 
 Must not support static key assignments (RSA and 
PSK); 
 Must negotiate the most recent version of TLS 
(currently 1.2; exclusion of TLS 1.0 and 1.1); 
 Must implement strict TLS; 
 Must disable TLS-level compression; 
 DH keys of at least 2048 bits or ECDH keys of at least 
192 bits must be used; 
 No anonymous suite must be used [15]; 
 Authentication must be mutual (see below). 
Unless stated otherwise, these constraints consist of setting 
recommendations from the IETF guideline cited above to 
requirements. For simplicity, the allowed TLS cipher suites 
are restricted to the ones recommended in the document [17]: 
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 
 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 
One reason for changing the IETF recommendations to 
mandatory is that the gateway is regarded critical 
infrastructure and has therefore a higher demand of security 
than standard desktop machines or web-enabled devices. 
Another reason is that generally industrial and energy systems 
have longer product life cycles and therefore the time period 
the security measures have to prevail are also longer. Because 
of this, the key size is restricted to 128 bits or greater, for they 
are recommended beyond 2031 by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) [18]. Another related issue 
is the block size of symmetric encryption algorithms. Block 
sizes of 64 bits are generally not recommended [19] and 
therefore prohibited for the gateway. Of the encryption 
algorithms currently standardized in TLS [20], only AES, 
SEED, CAMELLIA and ARIA fulfill this requirement. Of 
these four, SEED does not occur in a cipher suite in 
CCM/GCM mode and does therefore practically not fulfill 
these requirements. AES is strongly recommended, as it is the 
most proliferated of these algorithms. CCM and GCM are 
generally recommended, because both of them offer a 
combined authentication and encryption algorithm. Also, the 
gateway specification mentioned above is defined within the 
project, allowing the requirements to be more strict compared 
to the general TLS specifications, which is designed for 
systems that have to cope with a broader range of peers that 
have to interoperate. It is further assumed that peering 
gateway devices are known to each other a priori and therefore 
are able to authenticate mutually, which might not be possible 
for webservers, which are usually interacting with thousands 
of clients. All of these reasons above both allow and require 
restricting the cryptographic configurations to a narrower set 
than in an ordinary or more generic ICT infrastructure 
environment. 
C. Data Storage Requirements 
In the same manner as in communication channels, data 
stored locally on the device has to be secured from 
unauthorized access. Apart from system access controls, this 
data has to be encrypted and integrity checked by the same 
algorithmic methods as communication lines. This is 
distinctively a requirement for security relevant data 
(explicitly logs that contain security events), which must be 
encrypted and integrity checked. Additionally, for privacy 
reasons, some sort of anonymization method (see Section V) 
has to be implemented, if personal data is to be processed. As 
it is a sensitive part, special focus on the key management is 
needed. A key derivation function that is deemed state of the 
art by current research must be used. A smart card-based key 
derivation function is recommended. To protect systems (i.e. 
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ICS) in contact with the gateway, some sort of filtering (ICS 
intrusion protection or anomaly detection system) is also 
recommended. The model for this secure data storage is yet to 
be elaborated. Apart from that, a model that stores only 
minimum data directly on the device could be used. Instead, 
all data could be sent to a secure, trusted server within the 
service operator’s trusted zone could be used. This however, 
does not nullify the need for storage security, for there will 
always be stored data for authentication (credentials or 
certificates for communications authentication) and device 
caching purposes. The latter is strongly advised to prevent 
data loss in case of unforeseen device resets or outage, in 
which case data might not be transferred correctly and timely. 
To achieve appropriate storage security, we recommend using 
disk encryption (for instance, using dm-crypt on Linux-based 
systems). 
D. Intra-site (M2M) Communication Requirements 
Although, due to the heterogeneous nature of the connected 
energy production, energy consumption and storage devices, it 
is currently difficult to give advice on secure M2M 
communications. The minimum requirement should be a 
protocol that provides at least a similar security level as the 
IEC 62351 standard [21], although this standard does not 
necessarily assure end-to-end security [22]. Due to the latter, 
still cryptographic end-to-end node protection, as described 
above should be in place. As the devices, ordinarily only 
operate with limited system resources, using only the shorter 
of the recommended key lengths and relying on elliptic curve 
cryptography is advisable [23]. 
As other M2M protocols (like MTConnect) lay even less (if 
any at all) focus on security, we strongly recommend using 
OPC UA (standardized as IEC/TR 62541 [24]) with WS 
Secure Conversation as means of intra-site M2M 
communications. Further research enhancing security in this 
area is expected as the importance of M2M communications is 
on the rise. Generally, we recommend, as it is common 
practice, to segregate Industrial Control System (ICS) and 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks 
as much as possible, both among each other (if there is more 
than one) and from ICT networks, especially the Internet. 
Means of segregation include (but are not limited to), 
depending on possibility and needed security level, physical 
isolation (through lack of connection or data diodes), VLANs, 
network layer segregation, whitelisting and network firewalls. 
Following the defense in depth principle (also called layered 
security) [25], we suggest not relying on a single line of 
protection, but securing every part of the network graph 
(Figure 1) separately, for experience has shown that there is 
always a certain probability that network segregation is not a 
hundred percent effective (for instance because of a posteriori 
design changes). Apart from that, established techniques from 
traditional network security, like rate limiting and filtering 
should be used [5]. Further considerations are out of scope, as 
this paper defines only the gateway’s security requirements. 
V. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE STORAGE 
COMMUNICATIONS GATEWAY 
Privacy aspects in STORY are not limited to confidentiality 
and access control. The sensors in use will generate a large 
amount of data and partly highly sensitive personal data about 
activities within the demonstration site. At residential building 
demonstrations, the connection to smart household appliances 
or smart home functionality has to be considered, because it 
might have a huge impact on the privacy of a person. The 
amount of personal data that might be collected this way can 
potentially deliver a lot of information about a person’s 
behavior, location and actions, as well as health and finance 
status. In the area of industrial demo sites, the interconnection 
with other deployed systems may have serious impact 
regarding accessibility of confidential internal information 
(data protection) and processes. Therefore, measurements 
have to be undertaken to protect this information from 
unauthorized access.  
A. Standards and Initiatives with Privacy context 
Our privacy recommendations draw from a series of 
European and international efforts to safeguard personal (end 
consumers’) sensitive data. Primarily, the European General 
Data Protection Regulation, being ius congens in the EU’s 
legal sphere, serves as pivotal point for our privacy 
considerations.  
 
1) European General Data Protection Regulation 
The European Union unified data protection within its 
jurisdiction with a single law, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) [26]. This new legislation covers the so-
called right to be forgotten and related rights for customers 
(restriction, rectification and erasure of personal data), as well 
as the data processing companies’ obligation to classify, 
control and monitor data, including means to protect them 
from unauthorized access, further increasing the need for the 
measures proposed in Section IV. Non-compliance to this 
regulation is punishable with penalties of up to four percent of 
the corporation’s global profit or 20 million Euros. This 
outspokenly customer-friendly legislation, in conjunction with 
the complexity of the potentially harvested and processed data 
creates the necessity for a data privacy model (see below).  
 
2) Other Initiatives 
In order to achieve a comprehensive view on privacy and 
give appropriate recommendation for data collection and 
processing in the storage communications gateway, a 
collection of initiatives related to data privacy was sighted and 
aggregated, yielding the recommendations in the next section. 
In particular, the considered initiatives and documents include 
the following: 
 The OECD Privacy Framework [27]; 
 The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles [28] and them 
being rendered to supply only insufficient privacy 
guarantees [29]; 
 The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield [30], including an 
opposing view by European Digital Rights (EDRi) for 
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not going far enough to protect the EU citizens’ rights 
[31]; 
 The IPEN initiative [32]; 
 The Online Trust Alliance’ IoT Trust Framework [33]; 
 The OWASP Top 10 Privacy Risk Project [34].  
B. Privacy Recommendations for the Storage Communication 
Gateway 
After sighting the sources mentioned above, the following 
privacy requirements were derived for the Storage 
Communication Gateway: 
 All personally identifiable and sensible data must be 
encrypted using state of the art encryption standards; 
 Establish state of the art access control mechanism to 
all data; 
 Specify the nature and purpose of processed personally 
identifiable and sensitive data types and attributes; 
 If sensitive data is transferred outside the premises, 
only the part of the data that is reasonably useful for the 
functionality must be allowed to be transferred; 
 If data is transferred outside the premise, personalized 
data has to be pseudonymized; 
 If data is transferred outside operations, personalized 
data has to be anonymized; 
 During the transfer, all data has to be encrypted by 
using current generally accepted state of the art security 
standards; 
 In general, data must only be stored within storage de-
vices located inside the EU; 
 Collected data should not be shared with third party 
organizations; 
 Specify the data storage duration; 
 Provide information about policies, terms and 
conditions to the user; 
 Provide information and control mechanisms for users 
to decline collection and initiate removal of 
personalized data. 
These requirements must be underpinned by an 
anonymization model which sets on t-closeness [35]. The 
model description is too extensive to be covered in this 
requirements specification. If personal data is to be transferred 
to third parties for processing and providing analytical (big 
data) services, it has occur via a trusted secure broker, 
allowing no linkage between processed data and personalities 
of the originator. 
C. Availability 
Availability requirements to the gateway were elaborated 
through a survey, consisting of questionnaires, sent out to each 
of demo sites. This survey, constituting an aggregated 
operator-side assessment, yielded that the gateway has to be 
available 24 hours a day (24/7), more precisely it has to 
exhibit an uptime of 99.9% (three nines) for STORY 
operations. To achieve this objective, a backup solution for 
data and configuration information is required. In general, the 
gateway itself has to be linked to the power supply directly. 
Depending on the local operation mode at the STORY demo 
site, an islanded mode without power from the grid might be 
required. Considering this, a battery or uninterruptible power 
source (UPS) to enable such a mode is required to ensure both 
operational availability at such high level and data loss 
prevention. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This research in progress paper outlined the requirements 
for a Secure Smart Grid Storage Communications Gateway as 
defined by the needs of the demonstration cases of the 
STORY project. The key findings are as follows:  
 Node security requires an access control (ideally 
cryptographically supported) and monitoring concept, 
as well as device hardening; 
 Communication channels should be secured with a 
recent TLS implementation using an AES cipher with 
128 bit keys or more, an ephemeral key exchange 
algorithm, SHA2 hashing with 256 bits or more and the 
use of the GCM cipher mode; 
 Data storage needs a secure access and anonymization 
concept, combined with storage-level encryption; 
 Intra-site communications should use the OPC UA 
protocol (and make use of its security features) and 
layered defenses; 
 The availability of the gateway should at least reach 
99.9% (three-nines) using appropriate power 
redundancy and UPS concepts; 
 A privacy concept based on t-closeness has, in 
conjunction with data storage, to be developed, coping 
with access protection and anonymization including 
their legal issues; 
These findings allow building a secure smart grid storage 
communications gateway, as well as other building blocks to 
enhance energy efficiency in a way that is secure from an ICT 
perspective. As this is research in progress, the next section 
outlines identified potential for further research. 
VII. FURTHER RESEARCH 
As this paper outlines the requirements for a secure smart 
grid storage communications gateway, the next logical step is 
its implementation. Therefore, further research is needed in 
technology and procedures (some of which have yet to be 
developed) that meet those requirements. In order to meet the 
privacy recommendations outlined in this document, also a 
statutorily regulation and technological model (including the 
secure storage of data both on the device and at different sites) 
has to be developed. Further, as the communication levels 
have proven to be different at each demo site, the implications 
of this circumstance on the security requirements have to be 
investigated.  
To enhance the overall value of the project, the project team 
is also dedicated to develop a standalone Smart Energy 
Platform (SEP). This platform basically allows brokering the 
services of application providers to end users, as well as the 
use of data to generate billing and energy data statistics. 
Figure 2 shows the Smart Energy Platform within the STORY 
context. The security requirements are yet to be elaborated, 
although it is by now advised to lead all communication lines 
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through the SEP and the gateway to both minimize attack 
vectors and reduce interoperability issues. 
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